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Fill-in-the-blank-emotion in dogs? Evidence from brain imaging
Commentary on Cook et al. on Dog Jealousy
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Abstract: What is needed to make meaningful claims about an animal’s capacity for subjective
experience? Cook et al. (2018) attempt to study jealousy in dogs by placing them in a particular
context and then seeing whether they display a particular brain state. We argue that this approach
to studying jealousy falls short for two related reasons. First, the relationship between jealousy
and the selected context is unclear. Second, the relationship between jealousy and the selected
brain state (indeed, any single brain state) is unclear. These and other issues seriously limit what
this study can show. It is important not to see this study as showing more than it does.
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In order to meaningfully assess whether or not a dog can experience (for example) jealousy, we
need at least the following: a clear and distinct definition of jealousy; a context that reliably
produces jealousy; and a distinctive outcome (e.g., behavior or brain state) that reliably results
from jealousy. With this method, we can then study whether and to what degree the relevant
outcome appears in the relevant context.
We should note that this method, although useful, relies on some premises which are
unproven: namely, that a context can be reliably jealousy-provoking; that a certain outcome (a
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specific behavior or brain state) will reliably arise from jealousy; and that jealousy is observable
in this outcome. This method also risks producing false positives (e.g., the context may produce
the outcome for other reasons) and false negatives (e.g., the context may not reliably produce
jealousy or jealousy-related outcomes). As a result of these uncertainties, it would be premature
to conclude on the basis of any single study that dogs either can or cannot experience jealousy.
With that in mind, we welcome research on this question. Unfortunately, Cook et al.’s
(2018) study fails to elucidate the issue at hand. Our particular concerns are as follows: (1) The
relationship between jealousy and the selected context is unclear, and (2) the relationship
between jealousy and the selected outcome (i.e., blood flow to the amygdala) is also unclear. This
of course does not imply that the study is useless; but it does mean that it deviates substantially
from the (already limited) ideal. As a result, we can conclude virtually nothing from this study
alone. We should accordingly take care not to see it as showing more than it does.
We can trace both the above issues to a previous study (Harris & Provoust, 2014) whose
methods Cook et al. replicate and whose conclusions they treat uncritically. That study was
problematic in each of the ways mentioned above. First, a context is created in which a human
companion pays attention to a fake dog within view of their companion dog. Yet no evidence is
provided that this context reliably produces jealousy — or that it is unlikely to produce other
emotional states instead or in addition. Second, an attempt is made to detect jealousy in this
context by coding for “aggressive” and attention-seeking behaviors. Yet no evidence is provided
that the coded behaviors are likely to result from jealousy or unlikely to result from other
emotional states. (Moreover, and notably, attempts to replicate even the weak results from Harris
& Provoust’s study have not been successful. Prato-Previde et al., 2018, for example, did not find
more attention-getting behavior in this context.) (See also Prato-Previde & Valsecchi, 2018.)
Consider now how each of these issues arises in the present study. First, regarding the
relationship between jealousy and the selected context: the authors create a context in which a
human offers food to a fake dog in view of their companion dog. Yet, as other commentaries have
also noted (e.g., Serpell, 2018; Vonk, 2018), a dog might reasonably have many non-jealousy
reactions in such a situation:
What is that strange thing? (perception of a new object in the environment leads
to an interest in investigating the matter further)
Imposter dog! (perception of a new dog-shaped object in the environment leads
to an interest in resolving this experience)
There is food going toward a mouth! (perception of food going toward a mouth
leads to a desire for food, along with a scarcity response)
There is food coming from a human going toward a mouth! (perception of foodgiving behavior leads to a desire for food along with a scarcity response and foodseeking behavior)
What is even happening right now??? (inability to comprehend what is even
happening)
Of course, depending on how the dog perceives the situation, they might also experience jealousy,
or a combination of reactions. But given the nature of the situation, it is not clear how dominant
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or immediate we should expect a jealous reaction to be, compared to other reactions. Indeed, a
better articulation of the very parameters of jealousy is needed in this and other experimental
attempts to elucidate private, phenomenological experiences.
Second, the relationship between jealousy and the selected outcome is also unclear at
best. The authors attempt to detect jealousy by observing activation of the amygdala. However,
it is far from clear that amygdala activation is necessary for jealousy across species. Even if we all
agree, as current scientific practice does, that brain activation — meaning, roughly, more neural
activity, as indexed by higher rates of blood flow — is involved in subjective experience, we still
have yet to link subjective experience to activation with any level of precision. The closest that
researchers have come is the observation that in humans a traumatic loss of certain brain areas
can result in a loss of certain abilities. The brain can sometimes compensate for the loss of one
area, however, by developing new abilities in other areas. Moreover, when we consider abilities
across species, we find that different species can have similar abilities whether or not they have
similar brain areas. For example, cephalopods seem able to see without the benefit of a visual
cortex (which in humans is necessary for vision; Godfrey-Smith, 2016a,b).
Relatedly, it is far from clear that amygdala activation is sufficient for jealousy across
species. In this case, Cook et al. choose to focus on the amygdala because, they say, amygdala
activation is involved in “aggression.” However, amygdala activation is also said to be involved in
sexual attraction, fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1996), assessment of fearful expressions,
consolidation of emotional memories (Phelps, 2006), and, according to one of the target article’s
co-authors, in "arousal ... in response to both positively and negatively valenced stimuli (i.e.,
either excitement or anxiety)" (Berns et al., 2017). Of course, some of these experiences can occur
independently of the others. Thus, either we are wrong to associate amygdala activation with
some experiences (which might hence be the case here) or amygdala activation is associated with
many kinds of experience (in which case it might or might not be associated with jealousy here).
Of course, Cook et al. are aware of these complications. For example, they explicitly claim
that "amygdala activation should not be equated with specific emotions.” Yet the validity of any
inference would still depend on the existence a sufficiently reliable relationship between jealousy
and the amygdala. Here one wonders: If the amygdala had received less blood flow, would that
have been evidence that dogs cannot experience jealousy? If a different region had received more
blood flow, would that have been evidence that dogs can experience jealousy in a different region
of the brain (or merely a lack of evidence that they cannot)? Without a clear definition at the
appropriate level of analysis (in this case, experiential/psychological), changes at other levels of
analysis (i.e., anatomical/neurobiological) risk becoming irrelevant until proven otherwise.
Here the authors might object that amygdala activation can be correlated with jealousy
whether or not it is necessary or sufficient for jealousy – and that if it is, then it can still be evidence
of jealousy. However, our point is not that amygdala activation would have to be necessary or
sufficient for jealousy in order to count as evidence of jealousy. Our point is that the correlation
between amygdala activation and jealousy is currently so unclear that even calling the former
evidence of the latter (especially in such a contrived context) risks overstating its importance.
An overstated positive result could do clear harm, for example, by leading people to think
that dogs are having more human-like experiences than they are and leading people to treat dogs
in more human-like ways than they should. An overstated negative claim could also do harm, for
example, by allowing people to treat dogs callously, assuming that they are not experiencing
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certain kinds of emotion at all. This is part of why it matters so much that we get the methodology
right – not only because of its implications for this study, but also because of the precedent that
it sets for future studies, a sentiment echoed in other commentaries on this target article (e.g.,
Adolphs, 2018; Silver & Santos, 2018).
One separate methodological point: Cook et al.'s analysis is based on the activation
patterns in only one group of dogs, an "aggressive" group, based on a behavior inventory, the CBARQ, which asks humans to rate dogs' responses in various contexts. Supplemental information
indicates that six dogs did indeed score slightly higher than the other seven; whether this
difference is significant (statistically or otherwise) is not discussed. These six dogs also showed
higher rates of excitability, food-stealing, and attention-getting than the other dogs; the
implications of this for the interpretation of the amygdala activation data are not discussed.
Cook et al.’s work adds to a long and complicated history of scientific research hoping to
elucidate the subjective experience of nonhumans: animal cognition. The scientific study of
animal minds has come a long way over the last half-century. Results in this field can have
important ramifications for an improved relationship between humans and other animals. We are
optimistic that with further careful work in this field, progress will continue to be made.
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